Dynamic Contracting with Flexible Monitoring

光华讲坛——社会名流与企业家论坛第6214

主题Dynamic Contracting with Flexible Monitoring

主讲人伦敦大学学院管理学院 Ming Yang教授

主持人西南财经大学中国金融研究院 刘俊教授

时间8月24日 15:00-16:30

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主办单位:中国金融研究院 科研处

主讲人简介:

Ming Yang是伦敦大学学院经济学与金融学副教授,其研究领域主要包含金融、经济和会计。Ming Yang教授善于研究公司财务中安全设计和信息获取之间的相互作用、信息获取和披露在支持协调中的作用、激励合同和监控、会计和最佳信息披露等。其论文多次发表在如《经济研究评论》、《金融研究评论》、《经济理论杂志》、《理论经济学》和《会计与经济学杂志》等顶尖外文期刊。

Ming Yang is an Associate Professor of Economics and Finance at UCL. Professor Yang works on various topics in finance, economics, and accounting. In particular, he studies i) the interplay between security design and information acquisition in corporate finance, ii) the role of information acquisition and disclosure in supporting coordination, iii) incentive contract and monitoring, iv) accounting and optimal information disclosure, etc. His work includes papers published in the Review of Economic Studies, the Review of Financial Studies, the Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics, and the Journal of Accounting and Economics.

内容提要:

我们研究了委托人联合设计的最佳监控和补偿方案,通过将信息设计纳入动态合同框架来激励代理人。委托人可以灵活地分配她有限的监控能力,在寻找证实或反驳代理人努力的证据之间,作为奖励或惩罚的依据。当代理人的持续价值较低时,委托人只寻求确认性证据。当它超过一个阈值时,委托人主要寻求相互矛盾的证据。重要的是,当且仅当他有足够的生产力时,代理人的努力才会持续下去。

We study a principal's joint design of optimal monitoring and compensation schemes to incentivize an agent by incorporating information design into a dynamic contracting framework. The principal can flexibly allocate her limited monitoring capacity between seeking evidence that confirms or contradicts the agent's effort, as the basis for reward or punishment. When the agent's continuation value is low, the principal seeks only confirmatory evidence. When it exceeds a threshold, the principal seeks mainly contradictory evidence. Importantly, the agent's effort is perpetuated if and only if he is sufficiently productive.


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